December2015
Currently Iran is facing serious
problems in Syria as no one is willing to fight for Assad and Tehran is forced
to dispatch its own Revolutionary Guards and militias to take on the Free
Syrian Army.
As far as the atmosphere inside Iran
is concerned, Iranian youths are not willing to go to Syria and fight for
Assad, and the regime is now forced to send its senior IRGC commanders to the
Levant. As witnessed in recent months over 60 such IRGC commanders have been
killed in Syria.
The following are a number of such
examples:
1. Following the halt ordered on
militia groups staging attacks in Baiji of Salahaddin Province in Iraq, and
Iran running short on boots on the ground in Syria, various units of these
militia groups were ordered by the Quds Force and dispatched to Syria in late
October. A number of these militia groups stationed in Baiji began departing
the city and stationing around the Baghdad beltway and city entrances in order to
plunder people’s assets. Kidnapping and arresting ordinary civilians is one
method of how these militia groups in Baghdad and the beltway are making their
incomes and armed Asaeb and Katayeb militia have been seen roaming freely
across the Iraqi capital. Maliki, pursuing his plots against the government and
Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi himself, has been involved in negotiations with
militia leaders aimed at hindering the government’s measures and paving the
path for setting al-Abadi aside.
2. In
mid-October of this year Abu Mahdi al-Mohandess, deputy commander of the
Iran-Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), sent a letter to al-Abadi calling for a
joint command center involving the PMF to supervise the distribution of the
assets, arms and ammunition. Al-Mohandess in his letter called for an increase
in the PMF’s budget and requested from al-Abadi to hand over armored personnel
carriers, HUMVEEs and other weapons and military equipment currently at the
Army’s disposal to the PMF. This request came at a time when Iran is known to
transfer PMF weaponry, including assault rifles, various types of rockets and
missiles, and logistical equipment from Iraq to Syria. Despite all this, 9th
Badr Corps commander Hadi al-Ameri and al-Mohandess, along with other militia
commanders, are in coordination with Maliki plotting against al-Abadi.
3. On November 4th Maliki
personal paid a visit to the Asaeb political office and met with the group
leader Gheis al-Khazali. In this meeting Maliki told al-Khazali that the
current political trend is an American-style campaign represented by al-Abadi.
Therefore, this process must be transformed into a trend in which militia
groups play the leading role.
4. Maliki also held meetings with Akram
al-Ka’bi and other militia group leaders including those of the Katayeb, Badr
and the so-called Jihad & Construction movement led by Hassan al-Sari.
These talks focused on the new political trend inside Iraq. Militia leaders in
their meetings with Maliki have outlined various commitments and obligations
for Maliki, yet to this day none have been implemented.
5. A senior official in the Dawa Party
has informed Maliki that Iran’s policy is focused on backing Maliki and the
militias in order to shift the current political trend in favor of Tehran.
However, in practice Tehran is refraining from directly hindering al-Abadi’s
measures and that of his government. Therefore, Iran is heavily counting on
Maliki and the militia groups.
6. In early November a member of
Maliki’s inner circle in the Dawa Party said Maliki has invested heavily in the
PMD as Iran fully supports this entity. To this end Maliki formed a PMD-like
force and installed one of his most loyal elements as its commander. Currently
Maliki is seeking the budget and adequate logistics for this force. On the
issue of how this unit will be used in action Maliki is scheduled to have a
trip to Tehran before the 2016.
7. Following its series of defeats in
its efforts of pushing the Free Syrian Army out of Aleppo, the Quds Force decided
to dispatch a number of its associated groups to Syria. In this regard in
mid-October the Quds Force sent a considerable number of Asaeb and Katayeb militia
units to receive training in Iran. Katayeb militants were directly sent to
Syria after finalizing their training tours in Iran, while Asaeb units returned
to Iran and they are scheduled to be dispatched to Syrian in mid-December.
8. Due to the high number of casualties
suffered by the IRGC in Syria and the importance of this force for Iran in
gaining full control over Aleppo, a member of the Asaeb political bureau was
dispatched to Syria in early November along with a number of Asaeb, al-Nijba
and Katayeb Imam Ali members.
9. The high presence of militia groups
in checkpoints across Baghdad has allowed these militia groups to roam freely
through checkpoints in the Iraqi capital and the beltway, along with taking
full control over specific areas. The latter is aimed at kidnapping and
plundering locals’ property. Katayeb and Asaeb militants are facilitating the
passage of armed convoys of PMD and other militia groups in Baghdad.
10. Following in line with American and
British newspapers, Italian newspapers have also covered the violations
committed by militia groups in Iraq. Mainfest daily on November 23rd
published a peace warning that these groups are acting outside of the
government’s control and behind enormous corruption across the country. Their
influence is far beyond the central government of Baghdad, leaving the
government unable to control the chaos and sectarian violence caused by these Iran-backed
groups in the country’s capital. This Italian daily also warned that these militia
groups have the necessary personnel, arms and money. These groups are in
practice plotting to gain more influence into the country’s military apparatus
to finally replace the Iraqi Army.
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